Complexity vs. Randomness
John Casti: (after about three minutes on the tape, setup complete): Now I wanted to actually focus not on randomness but on complexity, which is in fact my manifesto, because I think that complexity is a deeper notion than the concept of randomness. And I certainly regard randomness in some sense as the degenerate case of complexity, because I see it as a notion of extreme complexity. And just to give a little bit of a starting point on the idea of complexity I'll start by rephrasing Stephen's question as follows: "Is the Universe (or is the real world) too complex for us?" And in order to even make sense of that question I think one has to de-construct it and ponder almost every word in the question and allow it to be sufficiently vague to the point of having almost any kind of interpretation. And to further illustrate that point I am going to give you a little list that I got from Seth Lloyd. Years ago, when I first went to the Santa Fe Institute, before Seth Lloyd became "Seth Lloyd" he was a post-doc there (at the Santa Fe Institute) and for fun and just to illustrate the point that complexity is as much in the eye of the beholder as it is inherent in the object itself he wrote an article (I doubt it was ever published) mimicking the BaskinRobbins story of 31 flavors of ice-cream. It was called: "Thirty-one flavors of complexity." And he identified 31 different notions and definitions that people had used in literature to refer to complexity. Let me just quickly run through the list, I'm not going to say anything about them, I just want to enumerate them to you. So here's one set, having to do with the difficulty of description, and there you see algorithmic complexity right near the top of that list [likely he is projecting some slides at this stage] here's another category, that had to do with the difficulty of creation, and here are, listed, other notions of complexity.
And I don't think there's anybody in this room, certainly not me, that can actually tell you what each one of these things actually is without going to the literature and looking it up. And that's not very important, what matters is that there is somebody out there who's thought seriously about complexity and put forth this list to prove that concept as a meaningful notion of complexity. Here's some more: degree of organization, things like excess entropy, sophistication, metric entropy and so on. And this list even goes on a little bit longer: [ideal] complexity, hierarchical complexity, correlation, stored information, algorithmic [mutual] information etc. Now if you kept track of the slides as I ran through them you would have found not just 31 flavors of complexity, but now more than 40 flavors of complexity, not counting that one [he points to the slides] and this just goes to prove the point that what we mean by complexity is really something that has to be in, my opinion, kind of content-dependent.
And if you ask the question: "Is the real world too complex for us?" then you have to either add [something] to this list, as partly to answer your question or make something of this list, that seems to capture the essence of what you mean by complexity in that particular situation. So let me just show you a couple of artistic examples over here: this first one shows you a picture that I got from Karl Sims and below it you see the Lisp code for that picture. So, if you have a Lisp compiler on your computer and would run that code on it, you would get what you see on this screen. Now this is very much in the spirit of Greg Chaitin's notion of "shortest possible program that can be used to describe a particular object." You can count up the number of characters in that Lisp code and that's not necessarily to be construed that that is the shortest such program, as in general that is unprovable, but it's probably a pretty good approximation to that -and certainly serves a purpose of being an algorithmic description of that particular object. Below it you see what looks like a random mishmash of dots, but in fact there is a pattern in that picture. This is an example of a very popular thing, it's called stereography (or stereoscopy) and if you sort of de-focus your eye and sort of stare at this for a sufficiently long period of time a three dimensional object will emerge out of it. You won't see it now while I am projecting it to you because this picture is probably too small but the point is that it illustrates a different kind of complexity and it has to do with a notion that I personally believe to be the most essential ingredient in a complex adaptive system, which is the idea of emergent phenomena: that the objects that make up the system interact in order to create something that is not there in the objects themselves at first. Now, here's another example, and I'll just put it up as a question: which of these two do you think is the most complex? Is it this human on the left (those of you who are involved in any way in the arts world will recognize this face, it's the face of a famous British artist named Damien Hurst) and on the right there is a skull which is now the world's most expensive skull in the history, probably. You will have the opportunity to possess this object for a cool $100,000,000 so -what do you think? Why is this thing so expensive? What is it even? It's just a skull! But Damien Hurst, who might even argue that that aspect is in fact secondary, platinum plated it and encrusted it with diamonds and put it into this shop, gallery in London, and said that for a hundred million dollars it's yours. Now, from a standpoint all I ask here is a real world example of a system, two systems in fact -so which one do you think is more complex: the artist or the creation? If you can call this a creation -although it is a creation, but a pretty expensive one actually. But does it really have any actual complexity? Now that's an open question, I think, but an interesting one.
So, just to close this little part, my manifesto, a notion of complexity that I like a lot and is one that is relatively recent is the notion that complexity is not something inherent in the object itself -whether it's the Universe or anything else -instead it has very much to do with the observer. That complexity is a concept that has to be interacted with -by the observer. And just to give you a trivial example, think about a stone in the street. You go up and pick up that stone and wonder, while you look at it, to see how complex it is. Well, if you are a typical person like me, with no special training [in geology,] you probably say that the stone is not very complex, because there are only a limited number of ways you or I as non-specialists can have interaction with the stone. On the other hand if you were a geologist you would have a whole bunch of additional ways in which you can interact with the stone that are [in] applicable and that stone becomes vastly more complex for me as a geologist than for somebody who is untrained and doesn't have this observing capability powers. So complexity might be in this definition the number of inequivalent ways in which you can interact with an object. And I don't mean to imply, or claim that this is a universally accepted or vague-enough definition of complexity but it's one that at least acknowledges that complexity is not just inherent in the object itself 2 . So finally, here's my version of Steve's question: "Is the real world (also known as the Universe) too complex for us?" And my argument is that this question is at least as much if not more a question of philosophy than it is a question of physics or mathematics so, with that as my manifesto I would like to ask (the others can't hold any more, Davies starts, says something, Casti notices, asks for clarification) ... excuse me? ...
Can We Control the Universe?
Paul Davies: Well, I think it's clear that this introduction has been provocative enough (chain reaction of 2-3 people) to everyone present in this room (they all acknowledge, at the same time, that they'd like to speak too)! Greg Chaitin: The question is: if the Universe is too complicated for us then obviously we have to re-engineer the human being until the Universe is no longer complex for us.
Stephen Wolfram: So, I guess I have several things to say. One is that it is perhaps fortunate that the field of biology does not necessarily have [does not a priori start from] a definition of life [Wolfram continues , can't understand how he ends but Chaitin laughs: Ah-hah! he probably has heard this argument before and is satisfied with it, Wolfram continues:] I think, otherwise [Chaitin says: "biologists," Wolfram continues:] wouldn't be able to even get started doing biology. There's indeed much to say about these issues of complexity but I think that this question about whether you know, "Is it inevitable that the Universe is too complex for us to the extent that we would have to re-engineer ourselves?" Or could there be situations where it's inevitable that we have the same complexity as the Universe?
Greg Chaitin: So -is it conceivable that if we invented it and if it is conceivable that it has the same complexity as us we just forgot that we invented it? That's a question.
Stephen Wolfram: Well, we didn't invent the Universe! (Very loud reaction after a moment of silence, not entirely sure why 3 but Wolfram's tone was that of humorous, amused indignation.) John Casti: This question is a little bit similar to something you see in system theory where the complexity of the controller has to be at least as great as the complexity of the object being controlled and so, one might argue by saying: "look, however complex we are as human beings or whatever notion of complexity you choose to use, you can only access that part of the Universe which is as complex or less than you are." This would be the biological correspondent for the definition of complexity based on the number of inequivalent ways of interaction. But what if the Universe has indeed lots of degrees of complexity and we only have one? Paul Davies (continues after small interruption): But within this realm of asking what complexity is, and given that as John is saying there are certain, several degrees of complexity and if we may be able to manipulate the complexity of the unknown then my question would be: is there a sort of a bound on the Universe? I'm talking about a complexity bound that acts on our Universe and that says that you can only achieve so much in controlling the Universe -after that there will be some [insurmountable boundary of capability] that we'll hit.
Stephen Wolfram: Maybe something like the second law of thermodynamics?
Paul Davies (agrees with Wolfram): Yes, like the second law of thermodynamics but not quite the same, because, you see, by doing some things very cleverly -and this is what that interests me -it's not just any sort of information, it's very specific sorts of information that enable us to manipulate our environment. So if we don't figure out the motions of the asteroids in the solar system we can still, with a little push from one asteroid we can cause it to hit a planet, which is now a planet with a different trajectory, and by a sufficiently clever accumu-lation of changes I think we could configure our galaxies eventually. But there must be a limit to what we can do! We couldn't be able to work on the Universe and, still not be able to actually explain it, don't you think? 
Minds, Observers and the Universe
Paul Davies: It seems though that there could be a mind in the outer space some other kind of mind than ours, some other kind of beings than us, and they would inhabit the same Universe and for them the complexity might be different than what we perceive. Because when we think of complexity we always have this prejudice we always only accept and assume only our position and think we're the only one around, but we can imagine that the complexity of the outer space as seen through the eyes of some other beings might be different, although in a sense it's the same world -but as seen through a different, perhaps computational, perspective. Casti (interrupting) : No, I think it's interesting because the question isn't as much as to whether there is indeed a limit, or who cares if there's a limit. The question is: "Where is the limit?" And "What do you have to do to push that boundary out?" Karl Svozil: Well, I think that my position is that [as he speaks you can barely hear him, so people ask that he get closer to the microphone, he agrees] I think I believe that our ability to manipulate the universe is only limited by our fantasy and our fantasy alone. So I think that anything which we can fantasize about we can do something about, and we can produce [it] in some way or the other.
Stephen Wolfram: So as a simple minded analog to this we can think about the second law of thermodynamics and we can ask the question: given some energy in the form of molecules and random dots in a vacuum can we successfully extract something that we care about from that random configuration of bits. And I suppose one of the lessons of technology is that with [...] and things like that it used to be the case that people would say: once this thing is thermalized all is lost we can't extract useful [work] from it, but as we get to be able to compute more we get to be able to set up some [ Stephen Wolfram: So it is not the case that [the mind] is above the Universe and because we have minds, you know -(reformulates:) let's say that we are the first "intelligence," in our sense, or the first intelligent beings [things] to arise in our Universe, then it could be that the whole future of the Universe, that one day, you know, our Universe will look vastly different because of the [mind[s] in it] -but I think that's extremely unlikely.
Paul Davies: Do you think that it would achieve that without minds, or that [that can't be achieved at all] ... ?
Stephen Wolfram: There's a great deal, you know, there are all these things in the Universe and you look around [and you ask yourself:] Did they require a mind to make? What would a mind make? If there were an arbitrarily, sort of, future technology one that could move stars and galaxies around with -what would the future mind make? The NKS position is that any universal computer is a mind and universal computation is everywhere in the Universe. So the entire Universe has [a] mind! Stephen Wolfram: Or, more operationally, think about pulsars. When pulsars were first detected the first thought was that this very special signal must be of intelligent origin and that later gave way to [hard to understand 7 ] but now if you look at the details of pulsar you'll see that [...] and my claim is that that sequence that you see, from the blips, [in the [magneto] sphere and so on] is every bit as mind-like as any[thing else] you will ever see.
Communicating Minds
Paul Davies: That might suggest that we could try to look for a message from the pulsars. 
The point is that your perspective basically dramatically anthropomorphizes [Davies agrees: "Sure."] A message is something that we would be able to recognize as meaningful etc. What I'm asking [hard to decipher]. On the other hand the idea that that everything is a mind that's a little bit too generous, perhaps: it's as if every statement is a theorem which is not very helpful, because you can't distinguish between minds and non-minds if everything is a mind.
Stephen Wolfram: But there's sharp distinction between... (pauses for a moment then starts again:) Most of what's been studied in the physics in the past is not mind-like, it's in fact too simple to be mind-like. The idea that people have had since ancient time that [and that was the predominant thought about things] the impression that people had, and I don't think this is wrong, as modern scientists would have people believe was to say that there are many things that you can predict on the basis of thinking that the weather has a mind of itself so to speak -you can know things about the extent to which it is conceivable or predictable and so on. But, with respect to this thing about SETI, I'd be really curious to push on this and find out: Is there a message?
Paul Davies: Right! Greg Chaitin: Can I say what I think that the right message to send would be? It wouldn't be a TV program Fred Hoyle had another [idea], in another book -which was a pretty bad book, I preferred the A for Andromeda 8 -had the idea that the kind of message that you would send would be a piece of software that wanted to propagate. So if you send a computer program and obviously an instruction manual for the computer/machine you would run it on, and then the people in this story of Fred Hoyle's -they construct a computer and then they start to run the program on it, and it's an artificial intelligence. So this would be one way for organisms which would be software to send themselves across the Universe.
Stephen Wolfram: That's the ultimate computer worm.
Gregory Chaitin (continues): Yes, this would be a life form that would transmit itself as a message. And it seems to me that that would be the only interesting message: a message that wants to come here and start running here because that's the only interesting way to send yourself across the Universe: as a message, if you're software. You're an AI program that comes to Earth and starts running. And now you're here! Greg Chaitin: But the message is -but the way you tell the message, the viewpoint is that you start running the software and if starts having a conversation with you and it wants to take over the government, then that was a meaningful message ... [otherwise it would look random] ...
Stephen Wolfram:
I see what you're saying. But there's an interesting fact: in the past when you would scan radio bands you would hear all kinds of obviously meaningful stuff. Nowadays with all the cell phones and all the digital stuff and so on increasingly you can't hear anything any more because it's all been compressed. And also the whole idea of broadcasting signals seems to be old news. I don't think that [messages] ... Stephen Wolfram (tries to sum up): So let's assume there is a message. When we listen to whales' songs it's really hard to say what they're about. Here's an amusing historical anecdote: in the distant past, when the radio was new, Marconi who was one of the developers of radio had a yacht and he went to cross the Atlantic in his yacht, and in the middle of the Atlantic he was listening on his radio mast and he heard this kind of [woo-eeeo-ooaah] ... I can't really imitate the thing (people kind of laugh) but that's what they sound when you listen to them. From his radio mast. OK, so what did he conclude that these things were? His best hypothesis was that they were the martians ... radio messages from the martians. They turned out to be ionospheric [Whistler bars?] from magnetohydrodynamics. So this is a case where (the whales, that is) where we hear something which is at least seemingly undistinguishable from what is a mind-like physical system and presumably a mind-like biological system. John Casti: Actually I think that this whale business raises a very interesting and important message for SETI and that is: we have, through the years, seen a lot of different experiments (people trying to talk to dolphins and chimpanzees and octopuses and whatever) and by and large my impression has been that in most of these experiments -I would just call them failures. Failures in the sense that the level of actual communication was pretty minimal. So here we are trying to communicate with organisms that we have shared a very long evolutionary history with, for so many centuries, and we do a very poor job in establishing any meaningful communication -even if we believe that these are messages. Why do we ever imagine that if we ever get a signal from a beam [coming from a distant civilization] that we'd understand the message?
Paul Davies: Well, yeah, yeah, but ... Greg Chaitin: Can I invert this question, if I can interrupt, I think that you should go about this the other way, Paul: we should be the SETI, we should be the message, so what we should do would be to send a message and hope that somebody that receives it would run it on the computer, and it would be us [the program's output] -or a copy of us. It would be an AI exploratory program which will look around and see the planet it's on and then send us the information [about it in a] message [that we could understand it in the slightest].
Paul Davies: It's been done. Greg Chaitin: Well, I know, it's difficult, this is not a complete program or I would have done it already. And then you send out this long program that is in fact you, that would start going around and interact with the natives trying to find information and send it back to us. And there we go: zoom! We're the SETI and the idea is to attract attention to yourself so that you will get to be run. You want to send a piece of code that people would be curious to try running on the computers and see what happens! That's how we get there: we put ourselves into [this other environment] ...
Stephen Wolfram: By the way I think that this thing about communicating with/to animals and so on, my own guess with respect to that (I guess I should be warning you I will say something slightly outrageous) but my own guess is that in the next few years if anybody [is indeed working on this] with modern techniques [...] and so on, it would be possible to do a lot more, and here's how -right now, we we don't record (when we talk to a chimpanzee or something) we don't record everything in the chimpanzee's life and every kind and/or way that they interact and so on. I bet that if that was actually recorded and correlated with its experiences and so on that one could actually start to figure out a reasonable communication mechanism. I mean even now there are some promising devices, and my favorite example is (and I saw this as a product marketed under the name) Bow-Lingual 10 , which some of you may have seen, which is this thing where you type what you want to say in English and it comes out in dogs' barks. And then there's also a thing where it listens to the barks of the dog -and you have to adjust it, adjust it to the particular type of dog you have -and it analyzes based on you know [the format of a selection] out of a small collection of mostly emotional state kind of communication things and it tells you what the dog had to say.
John Casti: Does this sound vaguely like this famous New Yorker cartoon: two dogs sitting in a room, one of them sitting at a computer terminal typing away while the other one the other one down the floor, while the one doing the typing says: "You know, on the Internet nobody knows that you're a dog!" (big spontaneous laughs, but Wolfram cuts quickly in, he doesn't want to let what he said be washed away by the change of focus). ] You talked about meaning, and meaning gets closely associated with purpose: how do you know if the thing has a purpose it has a meaning and a purpose and so on. What are the premises and/or purposes of SETI, the ETIs and so on.
The Issue of AI
Paul Davies: Right -well, the thinking behind classical SETI, if we can go over [that] a bit, is incredibly parochial. It goes along the lines that they are like us but they have been around a lot longer and have got more money (laughs) and so they will send us messages and they will take it as a matter of fact, that is, they will assume that we have just sort of stumbled on the radio technology, so they will make it very obvious that this is a message and -in other words, they will take the lead! But of course we can't [bear] that ..
. [out there anyway!]
Stephen Wolfram: I think that the ...
John Casti:
Maybe acting a little bit like missionaries when they were going to recruit the natives for the church, and we know that this has not been an especially successful experiment, for the natives especially (Davies says: Right!) ... on this is that there is no reason that E.T. would beam messages out until they can be sure that we're here and they don't know we're here beyond about a hundred light years away and so it's most unlikely that there will be any advanced civilization within that distance. So, the strategy may be sound but it's maybe a few hundred years [a bit] too soon to start [this] ... 
Paul Davies:
Well this is where having an ensemble of 1 (one) is a terrible thing because it is very easy to think of all sorts of reasons as to why it had to be this way: so, if you play out evolution somewhere else you say "Well, yes, of course it makes sense to have information processing and sense organs, and then obviously you want that one off the ground and then in case you get hit, you need something that will prevent damage, etc." and you can easily talk us, and the argument into a humanoid type of entity -if we're not careful! Stephen Wolfram: That's because we can't figure out something else -although that, in and of itself, is very embarrassing! Paul Davies: But I think that -having [followed] SETI myself over 20-30 years -I've been amazed how even minor changes in technology have reflected on the change of the basic SETI strategy. Do you remember how in the early days the main question was what frequency they should use? The main issue was to try to guess a range to cover! Nobody talks about that any more because you can cover billions of channels simultaneously. So the technology just in 10-20 years has evolved so much that it changed the whole search strategy. So in another thousand years we may say "Obviously we have been using such and such..."
Stephen Wolfram: (Davies keeps agreeing): I think the invariant of SETI is that their search effort is centered/focused just around the most significant technological breakthrough on the Earth at the time; so, for example, the canals on Mars where just around the canal building period on the Earth, so there's a big influence from where we are at the moment on Earth (from the technology of the moment on Earth).
Greg Chaitin: There's a wonderful SF story about this. The idea is that some people are doing a SETI experiment on Earth, and it's their big project, and so on. Meanwhile there are people on other planets, these are ETI's [also trying to communicate] -so here we are, having discovered absolutely nothing using radio waves! Meanwhile, neutrino beams (he gets wonderfully excited as he tells the story) which this other planet think they're the only logical possible mode of communication are flashing out with these urgent message we can't see, and the sunset colors are modulating with some other rays, in ways that another group of beings think that would be the most obvious of all possible ways of communicating with another rational human being (which, as they happen to think, would be by colors). So the sky is flashing with neutrino beam broadcasts from one civilization and this meaningful message at sunset from somewhere else (from a second other civilization) and while we keep listening in the radio frequency spectrum nobody is communicating with anybody else! There's laughter but supressed as Chaitin is absolutely fantastic when he gets excited. He himself is very amused of what he said. There's a moment of pause, nobody knows where the discussion will be heading, Wolfram tries to renew the conversation in the topic it was before.
Stephen Wolfram: Maybe we should come back to [the reality of ...] (everybody laughs, all the suppressed laughter comes out now.)
Is Mathematics Inevitable?
Cris Calude: May I? ... I think that the Universe is random. And even if it is not true it is still productive for the human mind to believe in the randomness of the Universe and I will give you my very very short explanation as to why that may be so. All the laws of nature are mathematical idealizations of -essentially ways to approximate the finite by the infinite. The power of the mathematics as a modeling tool is based on the fact that it introduces the infinite as the approximation of the very large finite. The use of unbounded quantification makes every test to be finite so everything in the area of modeling can be falsified by not being validated. All the equations that you use in physicsthey introduce essentially the infinity which is very nice and perfect from a mathematical point of view but that cannot be checked in reality except for a very small sample. So I think that it is better [more appropriate] to not even speak about the Universe in general, but to speak about only local [rules] and probably the simplest example is say, somehow I will give you not 40 digits of Ω but, say, one million of digits of Ω and then one could believe that we face the laws of the Universe -well this sample is just a local regularity in the infinite randomness.
Stephen Wolfram: There's something (one part of) what you said that I don't quite understand, or maybe I just don't agree with it. Which is the claim that physics somehow talks about the infinite. If this may appear to be so, it is only because the traditional physics as it has been formulated in the last three hundred years happens to use the ideas of calculus -and has been developed around the ideas from calculus. Had CAs been developed before calculus I think history would have been entirely different. That is to say that physics as we currently see it happens to be using differential equations but nothing in physics says that's the reality. There's nothing in physics that is precisely a differential equation, absolutely nothing. You're looking at fluid dynamics or something, you see a bunch of molecules bouncing around and they happen to be well approximated by Navier-Stokes. The motion of planets is not differential equations but they happen to be well described by them. There's a lot of detail that is not that. I think that the laws of physics as they happen to have been formulated in the last 300 years in terms of this infinite mathematics happen to be just a coincidence of history. I don't think it reflects something (or anything) core about physics.
John Casti: I want to comment on that because it would be meaningful to do the following thought experiment: imagine that Newton had had a super computer. What would mathematics have looked today? I think that all sorts of things that were part of the traditional mathematics, like all the stuff about infinite series and limits and calculus and all the traditional mathematics as we know it today, and calculus itself would have never developed at all, or to the level where they are today and instead we would have had developed finite theories and finite mathematics, combinatorics various kinds of things having to do with computing so I completely subscribe to that view that it was an accident of history. Even the notion of the continuum is simply a matter of computational convenience ... Greg Chaitin: Well, don't some people think that geometry is built into the human brain, and the eye and the way images are processed [by humans]. That the human brain has tremendous intuition for geometrical processing, for images and a lot of the brain is processing this [through dedicated hardware].
Stephen Wolfram: So you're saying the continuum ... the reason we think about the continuum is because our brains are built in such a way that makes it a useful way for us to think. Which would make the continuum necessary, in some sense, so we can think about the surrounding world. Stephen Wolfram: But I think that it is the case that if we finally find a fundamental theory of physics which ... Greg Chaitin: You will, Stephen, you will... Stephen Wolfram: ... that's right, in every single little detail, so I don't see how the infinite gets in there at all! For example, if you ask the question: "Can there ever arise in the Universe (to intelligent beings, for example, like us) a super intelligence" then that question, if the Universe is unbounded, could in principle be an undecidable question, and then the infinite is in there. But when it comes to the basic description of the Universe, I don't see how the infinite enters in that idea of how physics will play out.
Greg Chaitin: Yes, Stephen, but Cris is only saying that the infinite was for a while a convenient approximation to the finite, because it was just that continuous mathematics was more developed than combinatorial mathematics which is a little harder to work with, and so it's a historical accident. He's just saying it's a convenient approximation. He's not saying the Universe is continuous, he's saying ...
Cris Calude:
Even worse: I say it is random. Or it is more productive to be thought as random for the human mind that we try to extract as much information about it. It makes you a little bit modest in what you try to achieve ... and then perhaps ...
Is the Universe Computable?
Stephen Wolfram: I think one of the key questions one that we would certainly like to know the answer of, and one that I mentioned earlier: "Is the Universe like or is it like Ω?" This is clearly a question that is of [great importance] if you're interested in the foundations of ...
Paul Davies:
Could I sharpen that by giving a very clear metaphor? Imagine that we -forget about the holographic principle, [and] -imagine that we pixelate the whole Cosmos into [fantasized queues?] and there's a finite number of variables that you can specify with each of these. Now imagine that we take the digits of in binary and we label each of those pixels by the numbers in the pixel so it's like a gigantic CA, we label each of them by the digits of , so then you have a mess but then you go on [to the next level of digits of ] and it's still a mess, but when you're running out [ Stephen Wolfram: So that's the muddle. What I am claiming is something much more extreme [about it,] I am saying that if we succeed in finding a fundamental theory of physics, I know this is going to give us some law of evolution, so I'm going to say: this initial condition, this law of evolution you will get precisely every detail of the Universe. So that means that as we work out the digits of pi the first digit is what happens in the first 10 Stephen Wolfram: I'm saying that it is computable in the Turing sense (at the Turing level of computation).
Cris Calude: So then randomness is just an illusion.
Stephen Wolfram:
That's what I am saying -for our Universe. Randomness is a fascinating thing to study, [no doubt, but] we just don't have it ... we can't produce it. It just doesn't happen to be produceable in our Universe.
Greg Chaitin: But we have pseudo-randomness.
Stephen Wolfram: Yes, we have very good pseudo-randomness ...
Greg Chaitin:
Like the digits of . You look at them -it looks random.
Stephen Wolfram: The question is with your effort to compute Ω: is it actually possible [to do that] in our Universe? If you had more tools, any tools you can build in this Universe: is Ω actually there [for us to find it, and look at it] in our Universe? And I think, but I don't know, because we won't know until we have a fundamental theory of physics, yet my claim -my working hypothesis, if you will -is that there is no way you can extract Omega from our Universe, and that true randomness in Greg's sense simply does not exist in our Universe! Cris Calude: How do you reconcile under this hypothesis the fact that in this Universe we cannot extract this kind of information with the fact that in this Universe we can talk about things that are so opaque?
Stephen Wolfram: So that's a non-trivial fact that there is this symbolic ... and I think it's a fascinating fact that we can talk about infinity even though we can't count to infinity we can have even in Mathematica we have the symbol for infinity and it has various properties and we can reason about infinity. So I think it's a very interesting thing ... Stephen Wolfram (continues): So you didn't get to this. And what I am saying is that the whole Universe you could just hold it in your hand, as a little piece of Mathematica code and then you just run it and you make the whole Universe. And, it's a non-trivial question, whether that is conceivable or whether we need a higher level of computation beyond the Turing model of computation or something else ...
It seems to me that your point of view is that Turing computation is a priori, this notion of computation is given before we start discussing the physical Universe. David Deutsch has the position that what we consider to be a universal Turing machine or a possible computation depends utterly on the physics of our Universe and could be totally different from [the Turing model]. Stephen Wolfram: It is one of the remarkable -I mean, the fact that we in the last century happened to have discovered the invariant idea of what computation is (if we're right about that [idea,] it's just a nice [historical] accident.) I mean it could be the case that [and] what we seem to be learning in Physics is that every sixty years somebody says that everything you knew in Physics so far is wrong and there is another level of stuff going on in Physics and from that intuition you might say: "Similarly, in sixty years, everything you know about computation is wrong and another level of computation will be possible" You might say: "Everything you knew about mathematics will have to change as well and in sixty years another kind of mathematics is going to be possible!" But we don't think that's going to happen, do we? 
Is There a Fundamental Theory of Physics?
John Casti: It would be more accurate to say that everything you do is only an approximation to the real thing and the next level has all sorts of different properties and so on. But I think that that argument that you just made, if it's true that it will continue to have an approximation and then a better approximation, and then a better approximation, and so on -and you will never get to the end -[then] that's a pretty strong argument against the ultimate theory of physics, right?
Stephen Wolfram: No, that's what I am [actually] saying: the empirical observations of the last few centuries have been such that it seems to be a bottomless pit, that we don't seem to [be able to ever hope that we'll be done.] I don't think that's correct. I don't think that that's the correct intuition. I think the reason [for which] people have tended to have that [inaccurate] intuition is that people have not seen examples where little simple things can build into things as rich as we might imagine the Universe [to be]. Look, it's worth seeing the same thing in mathematics. And if we look at mathematics we could ask: is mathematics also [the same kind of] bottomless pit? That is, is it the case that the mathematics of today will necessarily be superseded by the mathematics of tomorrow and is it the case that the unsolved problems of today will necessarily be solved tomorrow -in the mathematics of tomorrow? And that seems to be the analogous issue and my claim would be (and I think Greg used to agree with this, at least, but I am not sure about the others) so, if you look at mathematics, and one my favorite example is the diophantine equations, equations of the integers: in antiquity they learned how to do linear diophantine equations. Later in 1800s they learned how to do quadratic diophantine equations. Later in the early part of 1900s they learned to do elyptic diophantine equations, which were [leading] towards cubic diophantine equations, and so on. But there are still plenty of diophantine equations which we don't know how to solve, and the question is: if we just project the future of mathematics, will we, just like apparently in the future of physics, will we, every fifty years, be able to get further into the world of diophantine equations? So my guess is: no, my guess is that we're going to run into [a wall, that] we're basically at the edge of where we can go and everything beyond this edge is likely to be undecidable. And that will be the case where the ultimate level of knowledge [becomes[ something of a logical necessity 11 , having to do with the ultimate limits of knowledge ... rather than ... this is a place where we really reach the edge ... and ... maybe one doesn't believe that ... Greg Chaitin: No, no -because ... let me say why. Because let's talk about the notion of real randomness in the physical universe. That means that there are things that you can't understand, things that are irrational. Now my understanding of you and the principle of sufficient reason of Leibniz which Gödel believed in also is this: if you believe that everything is rational and that everything in the Universe one should be able to understand using reason, then I think you're necessarily driven to look for a discrete Universe along the lines of ... [commotion, Chaitin louder:] ... highly deterministic ...
Stephen Wolfram: Yes, it might be deterministic ... yes, but it might also be that there might be another level or reasoning. It may be that Turing level of reasoning wasn't the right level of reason for our Universe [there's more content to, you know ...] Leibniz didn't know about the Turing level of reason, he just had an intuitive level of reason, we think we have a precise sense of reason which is the one that ... right now it seems to be all we need to describe what we do in computation. I think this point though that you can describe things that you can't actually make is an interesting point, which is kind of the key to the success of symbolic mathematics. But there's one question that is far from clear which is how far can you go in describing things that you cannot make? That is, is it the case -I know in the higher [reaches] in set theory people are always concerned whether as you start naming more and more and more infinite kinds of things, does it all eventually fall apart? Can you go on to even describing things as you get to more level of infinities so to speak? Greg Chaitin: Maybe [there won't be enough [infinities?]] to go around ... ?! Paul Davies: What about hyper-computation, which is something we can imagine but can't ever do?
Stephen Wolfram: I think it's a question of physics, whether hyper-computation is something that we can really imagine but can't ever do, or whether the Universe does actually allow hyper-computation ...
Paul Davies:
Oh, so we're back to this business of what is in principle doable but may in practice be not achievable because it's outside of the capacity of the Universe to provide us with whatever it is we need from the technology in order to [ever be able to] do it.
Stephen Wolfram: Right.
Paul Davies: So there are things which are logically possible, but it's not achievable because they're beyond [the capacity of physics].
Stephen Wolfram: Right. So your question whether there are things that we can't achieve in our Universe -that would be an answer [the question of] what is achievable. But I think Karl [has prepared some notes and] wants to say something.
Karl Svozil: This is for all the younger people out there: Let me just point out that this discussion was an excellent demonstration that in order to be successful it's not enough just to be a genius, but you must also be able to communicate. So communication and domination these are very [interconnected] issues (laughter, he said 'domination' with a very heavy German accent, not sure why.) Karl Svozil (continues) : So (laughs) if you look at speaker's house, you can immediately deduce, or rather interpolate, the celebrity of the (excuse me) research that he is doing. But I would like first to comment on the issues that have been mentioned here before: finite versus infinite, continuum versus discrete, randomness versus deterministic. And in doing that I would like to use a concept (or an approach) that we can derive from the Freudian psychology and that they call '[evenly-]suspended attentiveness 12 ' but before I even start doing I want to say that I am more on the side of Stephen's ideas, that is I too think that the Universe is discrete [because this idea is more] iconoclastic to think that. On the other hand I am also very interested in the technology of the continuum because there should be some sort of correspondence with the powers of the infinite [which would then be in line with the continuum]. Let 
The Hunt for Our Universe
Stephen Wolfram: My guess is that out there in the universe of possible Universes there are zillions that are rich enough to support something kind of intelligent and kind of like us, and whether we write it in Mathematica or write it in Java or something else -which would end up with a different ordering, and there would be a different ordering as to which one is the simplest Universe, and whether there is any invariance [remains to be seen]. So one possibility would be that it will be a simple looking Universe because we live in that Universe and the primitives we put into our [computer languages] are such that our Universe will end up simple.
Paul Davies: That we couldn't discover our Universe if it's more complicated. In other words we will never complete the program you're talking about unless it is simple enough, of course, for us. So by definition either it's a mystery or it's simple. Then what happens? One possible scenario is the following: let's say this law is very simple; then you might think we are the only possible Universe, you know, that there is some kind of logical necessity that it should only be like this, etc. But let's say you find the laws of the Universe and they're actually rather complicated. Not too complicated that we never find them but that they turn out to be really very complicated. At that point you might suspect all possible universes might exist, otherwise why should we be in this complicated Universe, rather than in a simpler one that was a possibility but doesn't give us our Universe, it gives a different kind of Universe, but, you know, in some ways is a good Universe too -even if it's not ours. So, is that a conceivable ... 
The Future of Meta-Mathematics
Stephen Wolfram: So what I say is that the axioms of mathematics that have given is the 3 ⋅ 10 6 papers that have been written about mathematics, these are that -if you look in the space of all possible axioms systems, these are just a few axioms systems that are [...] around that space of axiom systems and that there is nothing particularly special about it [them] . I've done this thing with boolean algebra where I found which serial number of axiom system is boolean algebra and the answer was about the 50,000th axiom system. And so the question is [that] people nevertheless say: "God created the integers" for example. That's something somehow that seems more inevitable. But my point is ... Paul Davies: All I'm saying is that you need natural numbers in all of these.
Stephen Wolfram: So imagine a world in which, the weather has a mind of its own so to speak, and we exist as a gaseous intelligence. Where there are things that are going on that but there's nothing really to count ... you know, imagine something something that ... Stephen Wolfram: But will it explain ... so one possible claim would be that in any axiom system that is rich enough to describe something interesting there exists some copy, there exists something analogous to natural numbers ...
Greg Chaitin: Euclidean geometry doesn't have it. And it's also [complete?]
Stephen Wolfram: But Euclidean geometry is decidable.
Greg Chaitin: Yes, it's complete. It's decidable. No natural numbers.
Stephen Wolfram: OK, so this will be interesting. There's a precise claim that can be made which is that (ponders, for a moment) so, decidable (starts again:) let's explain the technicalities because this is kind of interesting. In theories of mathematics you can have those that are closed and decidable, where truth statements could be established in finite ways and so on. So boolean algebra is an example of one of those, Euclidean geometry is another example of one of those, real algebra is another example of one of those, integer, you know, Peano arithmetic integer equation (and so on) is not an example -it's an open thing that is undecidable and so is set theory and so are other axiom systems of mathematics. So the question might be (let's see, maybe this is obviously true) the claim might be that within any undecidable theory in mathematics you can create objects that are similar to integers (which have the properties of integers). I think that is obviously true -because I think it's universality that supports this argument, I mean Peano axioms for arithmetic define a certain axiom system that allows you to prove things about the integers, but I think that as soon as you have an axiom system (actually it's probably not totally obvious) if you have an axiom systems that is universal, in which you can essentially support Turing computation -then I claim that it follows that you can construct, you can emulate within that axiom system Peano arithmetic ...
Cris Calude:
You can emulate natural numbers in various ways, so the difference between what your Universe and what Greg said about geometry is that you can emulate natural numbers in both universes but with different properties. So the properties in geometry [are] much weaker than the ones in Peano arithmetic -so this is why you have this degree [of] decidable and undecidable.
Stephen Wolfram: But I think that the claim would be that as soon as Paul Davies: Remember it's machine ... a real machine with real laws ... made of real stuff ...
Greg Chaitin:
Well, you can certainly have a consistent notion of computation, an infinite number of possibilities where you can compute things that are not computable in our world and it just keeps going on like that. So I suspect there are perfectly consistent physical universes in which each of these levels of uncomputability is the level of computability that corresponds to that next physical Universe (Davies, Wolfram, Chaitin, everybody speaks. Chaitin finally continues louder than everyone else:) So we would take as the most natural thing being able to compute the halting probability for our machine but not for their own Turing machines.
Cris Calude: In this context an interesting question is how much knowledge do you get in these higher and higher models of computation. I can tell you that for instance that algorithmic randomness that we discussed here is level zero, and Ω numbers are in a sense the weakest random numbers that are random but they have the maximal compressed knowledge in them. You can construct higher and higher more random numbers, none of them having the knowledge compressed as much as the Ω number. So the question is not only how much you can compute but with what result. What knowledge can you deduce from more powerful computation? Greg Chaitin: ... at our level? And the answer is: not much.
Cris Calude: ... as a level of randomness ...
Stephen Wolfram:
No, but one issue is: you're asking what kind of computations can you do in a particular type of system or what kind of computations are easy to do with a particular kind of system. There's a question of whether in that kind of system you can do a lot of computations that you care about, or whether there are computations that you care about that you can't do. So when you say "not much knowledge is obtained" ... you've only got the Ω number...
Greg Chaitin:
Well, what we can perceive at our level, you know, if you saw an Ω at a higher level, Ω at our level is in principle giving you an immense amount of information. But given an Ω at a higher level (I'm just explaining what Cris explained somewhat mistakenly) if you see an Ω from a higher level (where there's an oracle for a halting problem for every Turing machine) that Ω (unlike our Omega down here, which gives a lot of information to us down here) that higher order Ω gives absolutely no information.
Stephen Wolfram: So you're saying that from our level we can't make much use of an Ω.
Greg Chaitin: ... a higher order Ω ...
Cris Calude:
Let me give you some examples. With Ω for instance you need about three thousand eight hundred bits to solve the Goldbach conjecture. With about 8000 bits you can solve the Riemann hypothesis ...
